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Abstract
We consider the problem of distributing the proceeds generated from a joint venture in
which the participating agents are hierarchically organized. We introduce and characterize
a family of allocation rules where revenue ‘bubbles up’ in the hierarchy. The family
is flexible enough to accommodate a no-transfer rule (where no revenue bubbles up)
and a full-transfer rule (where all the revenues bubble up to the top of the hierarchy).
Intermediate rules within the family are reminiscent of popular incentive mechanisms for
social mobilization or multi-level marketing. Our benchmark model refers to the case of
linear hierarchies, but we also extend the analysis to the case in which hierarchies may
convey a general tree structure and include joint ownerships.
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1 Introduction
Agents often organize themselves into hierarchies when involved in joint ventures (e.g., Mookher-
jee, 2006). There exist numerous reasons to explain this fact. The hierarchical form, in which
workers deal with the routine problems and managers deal with the exceptions, arises as an
optimal way to structure the organization of knowledge (e.g., Garicano, 2000). Ownership or
power structures generate natural hierarchies with related chains of command and responsi-
bility (e.g., Ichniowski and Shaw, 2003). It is also argued that workplace structures that are
rich in sequentiality are desirable from the point of view of incentives (e.g., Winter, 2010). De-
mange (2004) further shows that hierarchies yield stable cooperation structures when it comes
to allocating resources. Hierarchies may also relate to crowdsourcing and social mobilization
systems (e.g., Pickard et al., 2011), as well as multi-level marketing (e.g., Emek et al., 2011),
task solving systems such as Amazon Mechanical Turk (e.g., Rand, 2012), or financial systems
such as BitCoin (Babaioff et al. 2012).
In this paper, we are concerned with the problem of sharing the collective proceeds generated
from hierarchical ventures. To analyze this problem, we consider a stylized model in which a
group of agents are involved in a joint venture. The group is structured in several layers,
each reflecting a different degree of responsibility, command, or even seniority. Thus, an agent
located at a given layer is in command of (or, at least, held accountable for) all agents located
at a lower layer. In such a hierarchy, agents are characterized by their degree of responsibility
(location in the hierarchy), and the individual revenue they produce for the joint venture.
Based on that information, the issue is how to allocate the overall produced revenue among the
agents. Our stylized model is flexible enough to accommodate various forms of organizations
that are frequent in different professional sectors. Instances are law firms (e.g., Galanter and
Palay, 1990), physicians’ practice arrangements (e.g., Kletke et al., 1996) as well as renowned
architectural practices (e.g., Winch and Schneider, 1993).
Two focal, and somewhat polar, allocation rules can be considered for the setting described
above. On the one hand, the no-transfer rule, in which each agent keeps her revenue (thus,
ignoring the command structure conveyed by the hierarchy). On the other hand, the full-
transfer rule, in which the agent at the top of the hierarchy (the boss, or venture capitalist) gets
all the proceeds (thus, ignoring individual contributions to the joint proceeds). A compromise
between these two polar rules, in which certain upward transfers are allowed, can be formalized,
and we do so in this paper. The resulting family of transfer rules is close in spirit to the MIT
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strategy (e.g., Pickard et al., 2011), the winning strategy for the so-called DARPA Network
Challenge.1 It is also reminiscent of multi-level marketing strategies (e.g., Emek et al., 2011)
in which individuals are compensated not only for the sales they generate, but also for the
sales of those they recruited.2 These strategies can be seen as specific geometric (incentive
tree) mechanisms (e.g., Lv and Moscibroda, 2013) that are usually considered in the computer
science literature.3 An incentive tree models the participation of people in crowdsourcing or
human tasking systems. An incentive tree mechanism is an algorithm that determines how
much reward each individual participant receives based on all the participants’ contributions,
as well as the structure of the solicitation tree. In geometric (incentive tree) mechanisms, a
certain fraction α ‘bubbles up’ from one agent to the immediate superior, a fraction α2 bubbles
up to the immediate superior of the immediate superior, and so forth. In our case, a transfer
rule imposes that the lowest-ranked agent gets a share λ of her revenue, her immediate superior
gets a share λ of her revenue, and of any remaining ‘surplus’ from the lowest-ranked agent, etc.
Thus, there is an obvious connection between the transfer rules we consider here and geometric
incentive tree mechanisms. It is worth emphasizing, nevertheless, that the latter are typically
not budget balanced and, thus, cannot be considered as sharing rules.
We provide normative foundations for the family of transfer rules described above. In the
benchmark case of linear hierarchies, we show that the family is characterized by four simple
and intuitive axioms (Lowest Rank Consistency, Highest Rank Revenue Independence, Highest
Rank Splitting Neutrality, and Scale Invariance). If we add an additional axiom, referring to
two-agent problems in which the boss is not productive, the intermediate transfer rule for which
λ = 0.5 is singled out within the family. If, instead, axioms modeling order preservation (with
respect to either individual revenues, or the command structure) are added, the two polar rules
are singled out.
The member of the family arising when λ = 0.5, which translates to our context the MIT
strategy mentioned above, is also singled out as an optimal rule, when we enrich our framework
to deal with endogenous hierarchies. More precisely, suppose the aim is to maximize the
1This is a social network mobilization experiment, conducted by the Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency, to identify distributed mobilization strategies and demonstrate how quickly a challenging geolocation
problem could be solved by crowdsourcing.
2Famous cases include companies such as Avon Products, Inc., or Herbalife International.
3Computer scientists have been concerned with mechanisms that are immune to sybil attacks in which a
reputation system is subverted by forging identities in peer-to-peer networks (e.g., Drucker and Fleischer, 2012).
This is actually a type of manipulation to which the mechanism arising from the MIT strategy is susceptible.
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expected revenues of the agent at the top of the hierarchy (the boss), when the process to
get subordinates is probabilistic and based on the upward transfers the rules allow. The boss,
while selecting a transfer rule, would face a tradeoff: high upward transfers vs. weak incentives
for subordinates to join the hierarchy voluntarily. We show that the optimal rule to deal with
such a tradeoff is precisely the intermediate transfer rule for which λ = 0.5. This occurs, not
only when (possible) subordinates are myopic, but also when they are farsighted and take into
account their ability to hire further subordinates themselves.
Our contribution is also related to the sizable literature on fair division in networks. This
literature mostly organizes itself into two strands.
On the one hand, the strand in which the networks give rise to cooperative games and
where the structure of the network is exploited in order to define fair allocation among agents
connected in the graph. The canonical case is that of cost sharing within a rooted tree, which
can be traced back to Claus and Kleitman (1973) and Bird (1976). For fixed trees, the so-called
Bird rule, which can be seen as a counterpart to the no-transfer rule, and the so-called serial
rules, which convey a different form of transfers to the ones described above, are prominent.
This is, for instance, the case in the problem of sharing a polluted river (e.g., Ni and Wang, 2007;
Dong et al., 2012) which is reminiscent of the problem considered here (with the modification of
considering negative revenues, and thus interpreting them as costs). Another specific (and well-
known) instance of this strand of the literature is the so-called airport problem (e.g., Littlechild
and Owen, 1973), in which the runway cost has to be shared among different types of airplanes
with a linear graph representing the runway. The rules (and some of the axioms) highlighted
in our work will also be reminiscent of some of the rules considered for airport problems.
A common feature for the models within this strand of the literature is that the cheapest
connection (minimal distance) to the root becomes a crucial element, as it represents the
stand-alone option for the agents. This is not the case in our model, where the crucial feature
is the combination of the agents’ revenues and the location in the hierarchy. Consequently,
stand-alone options are not naturally specified.
On the other hand, there is a strand of the literature where networks restrict cooperative
games. Myerson (1977, 1980) pioneered this approach by using graphs to represent communi-
cation structures in cooperative games. A central result within this approach is that if agents
are allowed to cooperate in tree structures, the original TU-game need only be superadditive
to guarantee that the graph-restricted game has a non-empty core (e.g., Le Breton et al., 1992,
Demange, 1994). In particular, our analysis can be related to the case of TU-games restricted
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by a permission structure (e.g., Gilles et al., 1992, van den Brink and Gilles, 1996), prece-
dence structure (e.g., Faigle and Kern, 1992, Grabisch and Sudho¨lter, 2016) and peer groups
(e.g., Branzei et al., 2002). For instance, if hierarchies are interpreted as permission structures,
and these are restricting a predefined additive game where the worth of a coalition equals the
sum of revenues for agents in that coalition, our revenue sharing problem can be construed
as a game with permission structure (Gilles et al., 1992) where agents need permission from
all their superiors before they can cooperate (the conjunctive approach). For such restricted
games, a generalization of the Shapley value, dubbed the permission value (characterized in
van den Brink and Gilles, 1996, and van den Brink, 1997), coincides with the result of using
the serial principle on linear and branch hierarchies. In other words, it shares the revenue of
each agent equally among this agent and all of her superiors. As we shall see later, this is a
radically different solution from the family of transfer rules presented here.
It is important to stress that, in our model formulation, there is no predefined cooperative
game where the hierarchies are restricting cooperation. Instead, we relate fairness requirements
directly to the hierarchical network structure.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we analyze the basic model in
which the hierarchy can be expressed as a line. We introduce and characterize our family of
transfer rules for such a setting. We also consider a setting of endogenous hierarchies, which
allows us to link further the transfer rules to incentive tree mechanisms, as well as to single out
the intermediate rule of the family as optimal. In Section 3, we generalize the analysis to the
case of branch hierarchies (not necessarily linear) and show how the results from the linear case
generalize to such a setting with minimal adjustments. In Section 4, we generalize the analysis
further to be able to account for the case of joint ownerships. We conclude in Section 5.
2 Linear hierarchies
We present in this section our benchmark model dealing with linear hierarchies. Suppose there
exists a set of potential agents, identified with the set of natural numbers. LetM be the class
of finite subsets of natural numbers, with generic element M . Each set M ∈ M will represent
a linear hierarchy, with the convention that lower numbers in M refer to lower positions in
the hierarchy. For instance, if M = {1, . . . ,m}, then 1 is representing the agent with the lowest
rank in the hierarchy, whereas m is representing the agent with the highest rank. Often we
refer to agent m as the boss.
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Agents in each linear hierarchy will be involved in a joint venture to which all of them
contribute. Formally, for each i ∈ M , let ri ∈ R+ be the revenue that agent i generates,
and r = (ri)i∈M the profile of revenues.4 We imagine the boss as the sole owner (e.g., patent
owner or venture capitalist) so without the participation of the boss there is no possibility of
obtaining revenue. Furthermore the hierarchical structure can be seen as a chain of command
in the sense that every agent i refers to her direct superior in hierarchy.
A linear hierarchy revenue sharing problem, or simply, a problem is a duplet consisting of
a linear hierarchy M ∈ M and a profile of revenues r ∈ R|M |+ . Let RM be the set of problems
involving the hierarchy M and R = ⋃M∈MRM .
Given a problem (M, r) ∈ R, an allocation is a vector x ∈ R|M |+ satisfying balance, i.e.,∑
i∈M xi =
∑
i∈M ri.
An allocation rule is a mapping φ assigning to each problem (M, r) ∈ R an allocation
φ(M, r). We assume from the outset that rules are anonymous, i.e., for each problem (M, r) ∈
R, and for each strictly monotonic function g : M → M ′, φg(i)(M ′, r′) = φi(M, r), where
r′g(i) = ri, for each i ∈ M . Thus, in what follows for this section, we assume, without loss of
generality, that M = {1, . . . ,m}.
2.1 Transfer rules
Two (polar) examples of rules are those capturing the minimal and maximal possible revenue
transfers from subordinates to their superiors in the hierarchy.
More precisely, the first one imposes that each agent in the linear hierarchy keeps her own
revenue and transfers nothing to her superiors. Formally,
No-Transfer rule, φNT: For each (M, r) ∈ R,
φNT (M, r) = r.
Its polar rule imposes that the boss receives all revenues. Formally,
Full-Transfer rule, φFT: For each (M, r) ∈ R,
φFT (M, r) =
(
0, . . . , 0,
∑
i∈M
ri
)
.
In between the two extreme rules presented above a vast number of rules can be imagined.
Instead of endorsing a specific rule directly, we take an axiomatic approach and propose first
4For each M ∈M, each S ⊆M , and each z ∈ Rm, let zS = (zi)i∈S . For each i ∈M , let z−i = zM\{i}.
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several axioms reflecting principles that we find normatively appealing in the context of these
problems. Ultimately, our goal will be to single out rules as a result of combining those axioms.
We start with the principle of consistency, an operational notion that has played an instru-
mental role in axiomatic analyses of diverse problems, and for which normative underpins have
also been provided (e.g., Thomson, 2012). The principle refers to the way in which rules react
to agents leaving the scene with their awarded amounts. Here we concentrate on a minimalistic
version of the principle referring only to the case in which the agent with the lowest rank leaves
the hierarchy after the allocation took place. It seems natural to assume that the lowest ranked
agent refer to his immediate superior in the linear hierarchy to terminate his relationship. Thus,
we assume that, after leaving, a new problem arises in which the agent with the second-lowest
rank in the original problem becomes the lowest-ranked agent, but now also generating the
eventual revenue that the leaving agent generated in the original problem, and did not take in
the allocation. The axiom then states that the solution of the new problem agrees with the
solution of the original problem for all the standing agents in the hierarchy.5 Formally,
Lowest Rank Consistency: For |M | ≥ 2, where (M, r) ∈ R, and (M \ {1}, (r2 + r1 −
φ1(M, r), rM\{1,2})) ∈ R, we have,
φM\{1}(M, r) = φ
(
M \ {1}, (r2 + r1 − φ1(M, r), rM\{1,2})
)
.
The next two properties focus on the opposite end of the hierarchy. As we imagine that
the boss can monitor and veto changes in generation of revenue and changes in the hierarchy
we need conditions that protect the subordinates from changes and manipulation of revenues
beyond their control.
The first one says that the size of the revenue generated by the highest-ranked agent (i.e.,
the boss) is irrelevant for the allocation of all the subordinates: A plausible rationale for this
axiom is that, in a linear hierarchy, subordinates have no influence on the revenue generated
by the boss and, thus, should not be affected by its size. Formally,
Highest Rank Revenue Independence: For each (M, r) ∈ R, and each rˆm ∈ R+,
φM\{m}(M, r) = φM\{m} (M, (r−m, rˆm)) .
The second one avoids certain strategic manipulations of the allocation by the highest-
ranked agent. More precisely, it says that if the boss splits her revenue into two amounts,
5This axiom is actually reminiscent of the so-called “first agent consistency” axiom proposed by Potters and
Sudho¨lter (1999) for airport problems.
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represented by two agents ranked highest in the new hierarchy, the remaining agents should
not be affected.6 Formally,
Highest Rank Splitting Neutrality: For each (M, r) ∈ R, let (M ′, r′) ∈ R be such that
M ′ = M ∪ {k}, k > m, rm = r′k + r′m, and r′M\{m} = rM\{m}. Then,
φM\{m}(M ′, r′) = φM\{m} (M, r) .
In a sense, the previous two axioms convey certain rights and obligations for the boss, as
well as for the remaining members of the hierarchy. On the one hand, Highest Rank Revenue
Independence says that the boss is entitled to her whole generated revenue, whereas the re-
maining agents must respect that. On the other hand, Highest Rank Splitting Neutrality says
that the boss is entitled to bring a newcomer to the top of the hierarchy with whom to split her
revenue, but the remaining agents are entitled to preserve their allocations intact after such a
move.
Finally, we consider a technical property stating that if revenues are scaled by a factor α,
so is the solution. In particular, the axiom says that the currency in which we measure revenue
is irrelevant for the allocation process.7
Scale Invariance: For each (M, r) ∈ R, and each α > 0,
φ(M,αr) = αφ(M, r).
The no-transfer rule and the full-transfer rule presented above satisfy the previous four
axioms. Both rules are extreme in an obvious sense, which suggests that the set of all rules
satisfying the axioms should consist of those resulting from a compromise between them. It
turns out that this compromise can be described as follows:
Suppose the lowest-ranked agent gets a share λ ∈ [0, 1] of her revenue, her immediate
superior gets a share λ of her revenue, as well as any remaining ‘surplus’ from the lowest-
ranked agent, etc., and the highest-ranked agent gets the residual. Hence, if M = {1, . . . ,m},
payment shares are determined recursively as
xλi = λri + (1− λ)xλi−1, (1)
6Axioms of this sort have been widely explored in various models of resource allocation (e.g., Ju, 2013).
Note that our axiom only requires “splitting-proofness” in a specific situation, which makes it weaker than the
standard counterpart axioms in such a literature.
7This axiom appears frequently in axiomatic studies (e.g., Aumann and Serrano, 2008).
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for each i ∈M \ {m}, with the notational convention that xλ0 = 0. Furthermore,
xλm =
m∑
i=1
ri −
m−1∑
i=1
xλi . (2)
Note that we may rewrite (1) and (2) in the closed-form expressions
xλi = λ
(
ri + (1− λ)ri−1 + · · ·+ (1− λ)i−1r1
)
,
for i = 1, . . . ,m− 1 and
xλm = rm + (1− λ)rm−1 + · · ·+ (1− λ)m−1r1.
Denote the corresponding family of allocation rules, so defined, which we call transfer
rules, by {φλ}λ∈[0,1]. Note that the rule φ1 corresponds to the no-transfer allocation rule,
whereas φ0 corresponds to the full-transfer allocation rule.
Example 1: Consider the problem ({1, 2, 3}, (12, 6, 12)), i.e., a linear hierarchy made of three
agents, 1, 2, and 3, in which agent 1 generates a revenue of 12, agent 2 a revenue of 6, and
agent 3 a revenue of 12. Figure 1 below illustrates the situation.
6
12
2
3
121
?
?
Figure 1: A linear hierarchy.
It is straightforward to see that the no-transfer rule selects the allocation (12, 6, 12) for this
example, whereas the full-transfer rule selects the allocation (0, 0, 30). In general, the transfer
rules select the allocations
(12λ, (18− 12λ)λ, 30(1− λ) + 12λ2),
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for each λ ∈ [0, 1]. In particular, for λ = 0.5, the corresponding transfer rule selects the
allocation (6, 6, 18). Thus, in such a case, agent 2 receives the same as agent 1, despite the fact
that agent 1 is generating twice the revenue.
When agents generate equal revenues, the transfer rules can be fully ranked by means of
the Lorenz criterion %L, according to the parameter describing the family.8 More precisely, for
each (M, r) ∈ R, such that ri = rj for each pair i, j ∈ N , it follows that φλ(M, r) %L φλ′(M, r)
if and only if λ ≥ λ′.
Our main result, stated next, shows that the family of transfer rules is characterized by the
combination of the axioms introduced above.
Theorem 1 A rule φ satisfies Lowest Rank Consistency, Highest Rank Revenue Independence,
Highest Rank Splitting Neutrality, and Scale Invariance if and only if it is a transfer rule, i.e.,
φ ∈ {φλ}λ∈[0,1].
Proof: It is not difficult to see that the transfer rules satisfy all the axioms in the statement
of the theorem. As an illustration, we show that they satisfy Lowest Rank Consistency. To
do so, let λ ∈ [0, 1] and (M, r) ∈ R be given. For each i ∈ M , let xi = φλi (M, r) and
x˜i = φ
λ
i
(
M \ {1}, (r2 + r1 − x1, rM\{1,2})
)
. Then, x˜2 = λ(r2 + r1 − x1) = x2. For each j 6= m,
x˜j = λrj + (1−λ)x˜j−1. Thus, by induction, x˜j = xj and x˜m = rm + rm−1−x1−
∑n−1
k=2 x˜k = xm.
We now suppose that φ is a rule satisfying all the axioms in the statement of the theorem.
First, let M = {1} and r = r1. By balance, φ1(M, r) = r1 = φλ1(M, r), for each λ ∈ [0, 1].
Next, add a superior agent 2 with revenue r2. Let M
′ = {1, 2} and r′ = (r1, r2). Now we claim
that, φ1(M
′, r′) ∈ [0, r1], so φ1(M ′, r′) = λr1 = φλ1(M ′, r′) for some λ ∈ [0, 1]. Indeed, assume
that φ1(M
′, r′) > r1; then by Highest Rank Revenue Independence φ1(M ′, r′) = φ1(M ′, (r′1, 0))
so by balance φ1(M
′, r′) ≤ r1 - a contradiction.
By Highest Rank Revenue Independence, λ is independent of r2. Moreover, λ is independent
of r1. To see this, suppose, by contradiction, that we have r˜ = (r˜1, r˜2) with r2 = r˜2 and
φ1(M
′, r′) = λr1 and φ1(M ′, r˜) = λ˜r˜1 with λ 6= λ˜. Then, by Scale Invariance, φ1(M ′, r˜1r1 r) =
r˜1
r1
λr1 = λr˜1 6= λ˜r˜1, contradicting that λ is independent of r2. Now, by balance, φ2(M ′, r′) =
r2 − r1 − φ1(M ′, r′) = φλ2(M ′, r′).
8Given two vectors, we say that the former Lorenz dominates the latter if its smallest coordinate is at least
as large as the smallest coordinate of the second vector, the sum of its two smallest coordinates is at least as
large as the corresponding sum for the second vector, and so on.
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Next, suppose there is λ such that φ = φλ for all problems with up to k agents, k ≥ 2.
Now, consider the problem (Mk, rk) with Mk = {1, . . . , k} and rk = (r1, . . . , rk) and add an
agent k + 1. By Highest Rank Revenue Independence, and Highest Rank Splitting Neutrality,
φi(M
k+1, rk+1) = φi(M
k, rk) = φλi (M
k, rk) for all i ≤ k − 1. By Lowest Rank Consistency,
φk(M
k+1, rk+1) = φk(M
k+1\{1}, rk+12 +rk+11 −φ1(Mk+1, rk+1), rMk+1\{1,2}). As, by the induction
hypothesis, φ1(M
k+1, rk+1) = φλ1(M
k, rk) = λr1, it follows by Lowest Rank Consistency that
φk(M
k+1, rk+1) = φλk(M
k+1, rk+1). Finally, by balance,
φk+1(M
k+1, rk+1) = rk+1 −
k∑
i=1
φλi (M
k+1, rk+1) = φλk+1(M
k+1, rk+1).
The axioms from Theorem 1 are logically independent:
• The classical serial rule (e.g., Moulin and Shenker, 1992) imposes that each agent’s rev-
enue is split equally among her superiors and herself. In Example 1, it would yield
the allocation (4, 7, 19). The serial rule violates Highest Rank Splitting Neutrality, while
satisfying all the remaining axioms at the statement of Theorem 1.
• Another natural rule is the one in which all agents keep a fraction λ of their own revenue
and the boss receives the residual. In Example 1, it would yield the allocation (6, 3, 21),
for the case with λ = 0.5. This rule violates Lowest Rank Consistency, while satisfying
all the remaining axioms at the statement of Theorem 1.
• The hybrid rule obtained while using the full-transfer rule if ∑mj=2 rj < r1, and the no-
transfer rule otherwise, is another well-defined rule for our setting. This rule violates
Highest Rank Revenue Independence, while satisfying all the remaining axioms at the
statement of Theorem 1.
• Finally, a rule defined as a transfer rule, but in which λ depends on the sum of the rev-
enues, violates Scale Invariance, while satisfying all the remaining axioms at the statement
of Theorem 1.
It is worth noting that the parameter defining each transfer rule is independent of individual
revenues. This fact follows from the axiom of Scale Invariance. As such, what just appears
to be a requirement of independence of monetary units, actually has normative impact in our
setting.
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In what follows, we complement the above characterization result by adding several new
axioms, which will single out focal members of our family.
We start with an axiom referring to canonical two-agent problems in which the boss is
not productive. For those settings, one might find appealing to allocate revenues equally. A
plausible rationale is that, although the lowest-ranked agent is the only productive one, the
boss is also necessary for the production to take place. Formally,9
Canonical Fairness: For each x ∈ R+, φ({1, 2}, (x, 0)) = (x2 , x2 ).
The intermediate transfer rule for which λ = 0.5 is the only transfer rule satisfying the
previous axiom. As a matter of fact, and as shown by the next result, the rule is characterized
when replacing scale invariance in Theorem 1 by this new axiom.10
Theorem 2 A rule φ satisfies Lowest Rank Consistency, Highest Rank Revenue Independence,
Highest Rank Splitting Neutrality, and Canonical Fairness if and only if it is the intermediate
transfer rule for which λ = 0.5, i.e., φ ≡ φ0.5.
Proof: By Theorem 1, we know that φ0.5 satisfies the first three axioms of the statement. It
is straightforward to see that it also satisfies Canonical Fairness. Conversely, suppose that φ
is a rule satisfying all the axioms in the statement of the theorem. First, let M = {1, 2} and
r = (r1, r2). By Highest Rank Revenue Independence, φ1(M, r) = φ1(M, (r1, 0)). By Canonical
Fairness, φ1(M, (r1, 0)) =
r1
2
. Then, by balance, φ(M, r) = ( r1
2
, r2 +
r1
2
) = φ0.5(M, r).
Next, suppose that φ ≡ φ0.5 for all problems with up to k agents, k ≥ 2. Now, consider
the problem (Mk, rk) with Mk = {1, . . . , k} and rk = {r1, . . . , rk} and add an agent k + 1. By
Highest Rank Revenue Independence, and Highest Rank Splitting Neutrality, φi(M
k+1, rk+1) =
φi(M
k, rk) = φ0.5i (M
k, rk) for all i ≤ k − 1. By Lowest Rank Consistency, φk(Mk+1, rk+1) =
φk(M
k+1 \{1}, rk+12 + rk+11 −φ1(Mk+1, rk+1), rMk+1\{1,2}) and thus, by the induction hypothesis,
φk(M
k+1, rk+1) = φ0.5k (M
k+1, rk+1). Finally, by balance,
φk+1(M
k+1, rk+1) = rk+1 −
k∑
i=1
φ0.5i (M
k+1, rk+1) = φ0.5k+1(M
k+1, rk+1).
9Canonical Fairness follows from Structural Monotonicity and the Necessary Player Property applied to
two-player games with permission structures (van den Brink and Gilles, 1996).
10If instead of Canonical Fairness, one considers the axiom stating that those (canonical) two-agent problems
are solved in a specific (inegalitarian) way, say (λx, (1− λ)x), then the corresponding transfer rule (φλ) would
be characterized.
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It is worth mentioning that φ0.5 satisfies a stronger version of Canonical Fairness, which
indicates that in a hierarchy in which only the lowest-ranked agent is productive, each agent
gets one half of the incoming revenue and bubbles up the remainder. More precisely, if the
revenue of the lowest-ranked agent is x, this agent keeps x/2, her immediate superior gets x/4,
the immediate superior to the latter gets x/8, etc. This is precisely the rationale behind the
so-called MIT strategy, which is described in more detail below.
We now consider two new axioms formalizing two polar forms of order preservation.
The first axiom states that agents producing higher revenues should be awarded more. The
second states that agents located higher in the hierarchy should be awarded more. Formally,
Revenue Order Preservation: For each (M, r) ∈ R, and each pair i, j ∈ M such that
ri ≥ rj, φi(M, r) ≥ φj(M, r).
Hierarchical Order Preservation: For each (M, r) ∈ R, and each pair i, j ∈ M , where
i ≥ j, φi(M, r) ≥ φj(M, r).11
The full-transfer rule is the only transfer rule satisfying the first axiom, whereas the no-
transfer rule is the only transfer rule satisfying the second axiom. More interestingly, and as
shown by the next result, each of the rules is characterized by the corresponding axiom, in com-
bination with either Highest Rank Splitting Neutrality or Highest Rank Revenue Independence.
Theorem 3 The following statements hold:
• A rule satisfies Highest Rank Revenue Independence and Revenue Order Preservation if
and only if it is the no-transfer rule.
• A rule satisfies Highest Rank Splitting Neutrality and Hierarchical Order Preservation if
and only if it is the full-transfer rule.
Proof: We concentrate on the non-trivial implication of each statement. First, let φ be a
rule satisfying Highest Rank Revenue Independence and Revenue Order Preservation. Let
(M, r) ∈ R be given. We claim first that ∑m−1j=1 φj(M, r) ≤∑m−1j=1 rj. By contradiction, assume
otherwise. Then, by Highest Rank Revenue Independence we can vary rm without affecting the
shares of the other agents (i = 1, . . . ,m− 1). Thus, let rm = 0, which contradicts balance. As
11Hierarchical Order Preservation corresponds to Structural Monotonicity (see van den Brink and Gilles,
1996) when applied to additive games with linear permission structure.
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∑m−1
j=1 φj(M, r) ≤
∑m−1
j=1 rj, balance implies that φm(M, r) ≥ rm. Now, for each i 6= m letting
rm = ri we get, by Revenue Order Preservation, that φi(M, r) = φm(M, r) ≥ ri. Now, balance
gives φi(M, r) = ri for all i ∈M .
Let now φ be a rule satisfying Highest Rank Splitting Neutrality and Hierarchical Order
Preservation. By contradiction, suppose that there exists a problem (M, r) ∈ R and an agent
i 6= m, such that φi(M, r) =  > 0. Consider a new problem (M ′, r′), whereM ′ = {1, . . . ,m+x},
r′i = ri for all i < m and
∑m+x
j=m r
′
j = rm. By Highest Rank Splitting Neutrality φi(M
′, r′) =
φi(M, r) for all i < m. Now, choose x >
∑m+x
j=1 φj(M
′,r′)

. By Hierarchical Order Preservation,
φj(M
′, r′) ≥  for all j = m, . . . ,m+ x, which contradicts balance.
2.2 Optimal transfer rules
We have considered so far a purely normative approach. We singled out the parametric family
of transfer rules satisfying compelling incentive and fairness constraints. Now, we assume that
the boss has the power to implement a member of this parametric family, and the question is
which one would maximize the boss’ payoff. It is clear that, for a given fixed hierarchy, the
boss will maximize her payoff by choosing the full-transfer rule. However, a full-transfer rule
leaves no incentive to join the hierarchy in the first place. So, what if the boss starts on her
own and needs to build a hierarchy from the start? It is natural to expect that the probability
of recruiting a (revenue-generating) subordinate is connected to her potential earnings.
A dilemma thus emerges: a transfer rule associated with a low λ yields a high upward
transfer, but also reduces the subordinates’ (expected) payoff and, thus, the incentive to join
the hierarchy voluntarily. We aim to address such a dilemma in this subsection. For ease of
exposition, we assume in what follows that all revenues are normalized to unity.
One approach is to assume that agents are somewhat myopic, which would translate into
stating that the probability of getting a subordinate is equal to λ itself. Another approach is to
assume that subordinates are farsighted, which would imply that they take into account their
ability to hire further subordinates from whom revenues will bubble up. In this latter case, the
probability of getting a subordinate would be represented by the payoff of the subordinate. In
what follows, we analyze both cases.
We first consider the case in which λ is the probability that any agent in the hierarchy gets
a subordinate. That is, if the boss selects the full-transfer rule the probability of having agents
to join the hierarchy as subordinates is 0, as all their revenues are transferred to the boss.
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Likewise, using the no-transfer rule the probability is 1, as agents keep their own revenue. In
general, using a transfer rule, the boss’ expected revenue is given by
∞∑
t=0
(1− λ)t
Now, if the boss aims to maximize total revenue in expected terms, when λ denotes the proba-
bility that an agent within a linear hierarchy gets a subordinate, the following problem should
be solved:
max
λ
∞∑
t=1
((1− λ)λ)t.
It is straightforward to see that the previous problem is equivalent to the following one:
max
λ
(1− λ)λ,
with solution λ = 0.5.
As an illustration, note that the expected transfer from subordinates to the boss at (optimal)
λ = 0.5 is
∑∞
t=1(1/4)
t = 1/3.
We now assume that (possible) subordinates are farsighted and, thus, take into account
their ability to hire further subordinates (once in the hierarchy) from whom revenues would
bubble up.
Let δ denote the probability of getting a subordinate. In this (farsighted) case, the boss
would solve the problem
sup
λ,δ
∞∑
t=1
((1− λ)δ)t, (3)
under the constraint that the probability δ equals the payoff of any non-boss agent,
δ = λ+ λ
∞∑
t=1
((1− λ)δ)t. (4)
It is not difficult to show that the only two possible solutions of (4) are δ = 1 and λ > 0, or
δ = λ
1−λ .
In the former case it is therefore profit maximizing for the boss to set λ→ 0. In the latter
case, it follows that (3) is solved when λ→ 0.5 and δ → 1.
As shown above, λ = 0.5 crops up in different settings of endogenous hierarchies as the
optimal parameter choice for the boss. Thus, it is interesting to note that the transfer rule with
λ = 0.5 has a close relation to the so-called MIT strategy (e.g., Pickard et al., 2011), a specific
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mechanism for solving a task via linear recruitment graphs. More precisely, suppose solving the
task amounts to a benefit of B dollars. Then, the MIT strategy imposes the following payment
scheme: the agent who solves the task keeps B/2, then her recruiter gets B/4, the recruiter’s
recruiter gets B/8, and, so forth.12 Such a strategy corresponds exactly to the transfer rule
with λ = 0.5, in a situation where the revenue of the lowest-ranked agent is B and all other
agents have revenue 0, provided the boss gets to keep the residual (due to the balance condition
of our rules).
3 Branch hierarchies
In this section, we extend the linear-hierarchy case considered above to account for branch hier-
archies, i.e., situations in which a given agent can have more than one immediate subordinate.
We represent a branch hierarchy as a tree, where each agent is connected to the (unique) boss
via a unique rank path consisting of all her superiors (see Figure 2).
A branch hierarchy revenue sharing problem, or simply, a b-problem is a triple (N, r, s),
where N is a non-empty finite set of agents, r is a revenue profile specifying the revenue of each
agent in N , and s is a function mapping each agent i ∈ N to her immediate superior agent
j = s(i) (with the convention that s(i) = ∅ if i is the boss), such that the graph induced by s
has no cycles.13 Let B denote the set of b-problems.
Given a b-problem (N, r, s), a b-allocation is a vector x ∈ R|N |+ satisfying balance, i.e.,∑
i∈N xi =
∑
i∈N ri. A b-allocation rule is a mapping β assigning to each problem (N, r, s)
an allocation β(N, r, s) = x. We also impose, as in the linear case, that rules are anonymous,
i.e., for each bijective function g : N → N ′, βg(i)(N ′, r′, s′) = βi(N, r, s), where r′g(i) = ri, and
s′(g(i)) = g(s(i)) for each i ∈ N .
12Note that this mechanism is never in deficit, i.e., the residual from B, after obeying this payment scheme,
is always non-negative.
13Note the deliberate change in notation from M (in the linear case) to N , as “places” in the hierarchy do
not make sense for non-linear hierarchies.
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Figure 2: A branch hierarchy. This figure illustrates a branch hierarchy involving five agents, with agent
5 denoting the boss, agents 3 and 4 her direct subordinates and agents 1 and 2 being the subordinates of agent
3. Each of the two agents at the third layer generate a revenue of 1. Agent 4 yields a revenue of 6, whereas
agent 3 yields a revenue of 16. Finally, agent 5 yields a revenue of 10. In summary, the hierarchy so illustrated
is (N, r, s) = ({1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, (1, 1, 16, 6, 10), s), where s(1) = s(2) = 3, s(3) = s(4) = 5 and s(5) = ∅.
The transfer rules have a simple generalization to branch hierarchies. Formally, let i be an
agent at the bottom of the hierarchy, somewhere in the tree. Then,
xλi = λri.
Her immediate superior k = s(i) gets
xλk = λ
rk + ∑
j∈N : k=s(j)
(1− λ)rj
 ,
and so forth. Denote the corresponding family of b-allocation rules by {βλ}λ∈[0,1].
Our axioms from the linear hierarchy model also have a natural extension to the branch
hierarchy model. Formally,
b-Lowest Rank Consistency: For each (N, r, s) ∈ B, with |N | ≥ 2, and each i ∈ N without
subordinates, such that (N \ {i}, (rs(i) + ri − βi(N, r, s), rN\{i,s(i)}), sN\{i}) ∈ B,14
βN\{i}(N, r, s) = β
(
N \ {i}, (rs(i) + ri − βi(N, r, s), rN\{i,s(i)}), sN\{i}
)
.
14By sN\{i} we denote the restriction of the function s to the domain N \ {i}.
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b-Highest Rank Revenue Independence: For each (N, r, s) ∈ B, each i ∈ N such that
s(i) = ∅, and each rˆi ∈ R+
βN\{i}(N, r, s) = βN\{i} (N, (r−i, rˆi), s) .
b-Highest Rank Splitting Neutrality: For each (N, r, s) ∈ B, and each i ∈ N such that
s(i) = ∅, let (N ′, r′, s′), be such that N ′ = N ∪ {k}, s′(i) = k, s = s′ otherwise, ri = r′k + r′i,
and r′N\{i,k} = rN\{i}. Then,
βN\{i,k}(N ′, r′, s′) = βN\{i} (N, r, s) .
b-Scale Invariance: For each (N, r, s) ∈ B, and each α > 0,
β(N,αr, s) = αβ(N, r, s).
With these extended axioms in place we can now extend Theorem 1 to branch hierarchies.15
Theorem 4 A b-rule β satisfies b-Lowest Rank Consistency, b-Highest Rank Revenue Inde-
pendence, b-Highest Rank Splitting Neutrality, and b-Scale Invariance if and only if it is a b-
transfer rule, i.e., β ∈ {βλ}λ∈[0,1].
Proof: It is not difficult to see that the b-transfer rules satisfy all the axioms at the statement
of the theorem. Conversely, let β be a rule satisfying all the axioms at the statement of the
theorem. Let (N, r, s) ∈ B. We distinguish two cases.
Case 1: (N, r, s) is a linear hierarchy.
In this case, the branch hierarchy (N, r, s) ∈ B consists of a line, and thus we use the
abbreviated notation (N, r) ∈ R. Then, by Theorem 1, there exists λ ∈ [0, 1], such that
β(N, r) = βλ(N, r).
Case 2: (N, r, s) is not a linear hierarchy.
Let i denote an agent without subordinates in the branch hierarchy (N, r, s). Then, xi =
βi(N, r, s) = δri for some δ ∈ [0, 1].
Iteratively, we can apply b-Lowest Rank Consistency to all agents not located on the direct
path of superiors from i to the boss, in order to reduce the branch hierarchy to a line. For each
15Note that replacing scale invariance by canonical fairness singles out the intermediate transfer rule for which
λ = 0.5.
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iteration, the payment remains unchanged for agent i and we, ultimately, end up with a linear
hierarchy. It then follows from Case 1 that δ = λ.
The previous argument can be repeated for any agent without subordinates, which shows
that δ is not agent-specific. Thus, xj = β
λ
j (N, r, s), for each agent j without subordinates.
Now, consider an agent h who is the immediate superior of an agent without subordinates. By
using b-Lowest Rank Consistency, for each subordinate of h, we obtain a new problem in which
agent h has no subordinates, and in which the revenue of agent h corresponds to her original
revenue, plus the surplus from all the subordinates of h. Applying the same argument as above,
it follows that xh = β
λ
h(N, r, s). The proof easily concludes from here.
4 Joint ownerships
An important limitation of the previous analysis is that hierarchies contain a single boss. It is
often the case that a given agent has more than one superior, in which case we talk about joint
ownerships. For instance, two firms may jointly own an entity on an equal partnership basis
and that entity may again own other entities, either alone or as joint ventures. Similarly, for
social mobilization schemes, an agent may be approached by several recruiters and may solve
tasks for all of them. The aim of this section is to extend the previous analysis to account for
the case of joint ownerships. As we shall see, a generalized version of our family of transfer
rules will also arise in this setting.
A joint ownership revenue sharing problem, or simply, a j-problem is a triple (N, r, S),
where N is a non-empty finite set of agents, r is a revenue profile specifying the revenue of
each agent in N , and S is a correspondence, mapping each agent i ∈ N to her immediate
superior agents S(i) ⊂ N (with the convention that S(i) = ∅ if i is a boss), such that the
graph induced by S is connected and cycle free (in the undirected sense: that is, for instance,
S(1) = {2, 3}, S(2) = {3}, S(3) = ∅ is considered a cycle). Let J denote the set of j-problems.
Note that, as the graph induced by S has no cycles, deleting any link ij leads to two
components of such a graph, dubbed the i- and the j-component, and denoted by Giij and G
j
ij
respectively.
Given a j-problem (N, r, S), a j-allocation is a vector x ∈ R|N |+ satisfying balance, i.e.,∑
i∈N xi =
∑
i∈N ri.
A j-allocation rule is a mapping ζ assigning to each problem (N, r, S) an allocation
ζ(N, r, S) = x. We also impose from the outset, as in the linear case, that rules are anony-
20
mous, i.e., for each bijective function g : N → N ′, ζg(i)(N ′, r′, S ′) = ζi(N, r, S), where, for each
i ∈ N , r′g(i) = ri, and S ′(g(i)) = g(S(i)) = {g(s) : s ∈ S(i)}. Our family of transfer rules gen-
eralizes easily to the joint ownership setting by transferring an equal split of the accumulated
surplus of a given agent i to each of her immediate superiors.
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Figure 3: A joint ownership. This figure illustrates a joint ownership involving six agents, with agents 5 and
6 denoting the bosses, agent 3 being direct subordinate of both, agent 4 direct subordinate of 6, and agents 1
and 2 being the subordinates of agent 3. Each of the two agents at the third layer generate a revenue of 1. Agent
3 yields a revenue of 16, whereas agent 4 yields a revenue of 5. Finally, agent 5 yields a revenue of 9, and agent 6
yields a revenue of 10. In summary, the problem so illustrated is (N, r, S) = ({1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}, (1, 1, 16, 5, 9, 10), S),
where S(1) = S(2) = {3}, S(3) = {5, 6}, S(4) = {6} and S(5) = S(6) = ∅.
Formally, let i be an agent at the bottom of the hierarchy, somewhere in the tree. Then,
xλi = λri.
Each of her immediate superiors k ∈ S(i) gets
xλk = λ
rk + ∑
j∈N : k∈S(j)
1
|S(j)|(1− λ)rj
 ,
and so forth. Denote the corresponding family of j-allocation rules by {ζλ}λ∈[0,1].
Three of our axioms from the linear hierarchy model have a natural extension to the joint
ownership model. Formally,
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j-Highest Rank Revenue Independence: For each (N, r, S) ∈ J , each i ∈ N such that
S(i) = ∅, and each rˆi ∈ R+,
ζN\{i}(N, r, S) = ζN\{i} (N, (r−i, rˆi), S) .
j-Highest Rank Splitting Neutrality: For each (N, r, S) ∈ J and each i ∈ N such that
S(i) = ∅, let (N ′, r′, S ′), be such that N ′ = N ∪{k}, S ′(i) = {k}, S ′ = S otherwise, ri = r′k+r′i,
and r′N\{i,k} = rN\{i}. Then,
ζN\{i,k}(N ′, r′, S ′) = ζN\{i} (N, r, S) .
j-Scale Invariance: For each (N, r, S) ∈ J , and each α > 0,
ζ(N,αr, S) = αζ(N, r, S).
On the other hand, the fact that a joint ownership might involve several bosses, as well as
several superiors for the lowest ranked agents, calls for adjustments of the remaining axioms,
as well as for new axioms.
We first strengthen lowest rank consistency. To do so, consider an agent i and one of
her immediate subordinates j. It seems normatively appealing to state that deleting the j-
component, and transferring any surplus from that component to i, should leave the payoffs of
all agents in the i-component unchanged. Formally,
Component Consistency: For each (N, r, S) ∈ J , and each pair i, j ∈ N such that i ∈ S(j),
let
• N ′ = Giij,
• r′i = ri +
∑
k∈Gjij(rk − ζk(N, r, S)),
• r′h = rh for each h ∈ Giij \ {i},
• S ′(k) = S(k), for each k ∈ Giij.
Then, (N ′, r′, S ′) ∈ J and, for each h ∈ N ′,
ζh(N
′, r′, S ′) = ζh(N, r, S).
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Clearly, component consistency implies lowest rank consistency, as the j-component may
consist of agent j alone.
The following axiom is new. It refers to the case in which a given agent has several bosses
that are not bosses for any other agents. In such situations, merging the bosses will not change
the payoff of the remaining agents. Formally,
Top Merger: For each (N, r, S) ∈ J and each j ∈ N such that |S(j)| ≥ 2, S(k) = ∅ for each
k ∈ S(j), and S(h) ∩ S(j) = ∅, for each h ∈ N \ {j}, let (N ′, r′, S ′) ∈ J be such that
• N ′ = (N \ S(j)) ∪ {k′},
• r′k′ =
∑
k∈S(j) rk, and r
′
h = rh for each h ∈ N \ S(j),
• S ′(k′) = ∅, S ′(j) = k′, and S ′(k) = S(k), for each k ∈ N \ (S(j) ∪ {j}).
Then, for each h ∈ N \ S(j),
ζh(N
′, r′, S ′) = ζh(N, r, S).
We are now ready to extend Theorem 1 to joint ownership problems.16
Theorem 5 A j-rule ζ satisfies j-Highest Rank Revenue Independence, j-Highest Rank Splitting
Neutrality, j-Scale Invariance, Component Consistency, and Top Merger if and only if it is a
j-transfer rule, i.e., ζ ∈ {ζλ}λ∈[0,1].
Proof: It is not difficult to see that the j-transfer rules satisfy all the axioms at the statement
of the theorem. Conversely, let ζ be a rule satisfying all the axioms at the statement of the
theorem. We prove this implication by induction. First, by Theorem 1, there exists λ such
that ζ = ζλ for two-agent problems. Suppose there is λ such that ζ = ζλ for all problems
with up to k ≥ 2 agents and consider the subfamily of problems with k + 1 agents. Let
(N, r, S) ∈ J be one of those problems and let i ∈ N be such that S−1(i) = ∅. We now claim
that ζi(N, r, S) = λri. Indeed, by repeated use of Component Consistency, we can construct a
new problem for which all other agents (different from i) have a unique linear path to i, such
that i’s payoff is unchanged. Now, by repeated use of Top Merger and j-Highest Rank Splitting
Neutrality, we obtain a new (two-agent) problem for which agent i gets ζi(N, r, S) = λri.
16Note that replacing scale invariance by canonical fairness singles out the intermediate transfer rule for which
λ = 0.5.
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Now, let j ∈ S(i). We claim that ∑h∈Gjij ζh(N, r, S) = ∑h∈Gjij rh + (1−λ)ri|S(i)| . Indeed, by
repeated use of Component Consistency, Top Merger and j-Highest Rank Splitting Neutrality
we can reduce the j-components to a single agent, where this agent receives the same payoff as
the entire j-component did before. By j-Highest Rank Revenue Independence and anonymity
of ζ the claim follows.
Consequently,
∑
h∈Giij ζh(N, r, S) =
∑
h∈Giij ζ
λ
h (N, r, S).
Now, for a given j ∈ S(i), by Component Consistency we can add the surplus of the i-
component, i.e.,
∑
h∈Giij(rh − ζh(N, r, S)), to j and then eliminate the i-component. By our
induction hypothesis, the payoff of an arbitrary agent h ∈ Gjij is ζh(N, r, S) = ζλh (N, r, S), which
concludes the proof.
5 Conclusion
Priorities among agents is a compelling way to express asymmetric rights. We have dealt
in this paper with a resource allocation problem arising when every agent is arranged in a
priority structure and generates a collective profit. More precisely, we have considered a stylized
model in which participating agents, who are hierarchically organized, contribute with (possibly
different) individual revenues to the collective proceeds. The canonical application of our model
is the case of multi-level marketing. Another interesting application is the allocation of profit
in companies, as our model is flexible enough to accommodate several forms of professional
organizations and practices in real life.
We have introduced a family of allocation rules for our model, ranging from the rule ignoring
the command structure conveyed by the hierarchy, to the rule ignoring individual contributions
to the joint proceeds. The rules are members of a one-parameter family with an interesting
economic interpretation conveying a compromise between those two polar rules, allowing for
certain upward transfers in the command structure.
The intermediate member of our family, obtained when the compromise between the polar
rules is balanced, is a translation to our context of the so-called MIT strategy, which has shown
to be an optimal mechanism in practice for social mobilization. We also show that the rule
is optimal, within our family, if the aim is to maximize the expected revenues of the venture
capitalist, i.e., the agent at the top of the hierarchy, and the process to get subordinates is
probabilistic. In general, the rules within our family also exemplify usual practices in multi-
level marketing, the marketing approach in which buyers are encouraged to take an active role
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in promoting the product (offering them rewards for successful direct or indirect referrals of the
product to other prospective buyers). Our results, therefore, provide normative foundations for
such a type of strategies, formalizing the idea of ‘bubbling up’ revenues along the hierarchy.
Our analysis not only involves the benchmark case of linear hierarchies, but also more
general hierarchical structures, including cases of joint ownership. Thereby, our results also
provide new insights for the popular field of fair allocation in networks.
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